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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2005/1654

Title: Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings
Authors: Prakash, Gujar Sujit
Advisors: Narahari, Y
Keywords: Investments (Economics)- Allocation
Mechanism Design Theory
Heterogeneous Objects
Dynamic House Allocation
Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Optimal Combinatorial Auctions
Dynamic Matching
Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms
Two-Sided Markets
Submitted Date: Oct-2010
Series/Report no.: G24693
Abstract: Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate different types of spectrum licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign different sponsored slots to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems: Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing methods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, generalizing the current methods that only consider a single slot. Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, extending the existing methods for static settings.
Abstract file URL: http://etd.ncsi.iisc.ernet.in/abstracts/2145/G24693-Abs-.pdf
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2005/1654
Appears in Collections:Computer Science and Automation (csa)

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